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I
Here	are	some	well-known	principles	featuring	iterated	modalities:1
(B)	If	Φ,	then	necessarily	possibly	Φ.
(4)	If	necessarily	Φ,	then	necessarily	necessarily	Φ.
(5) If	possibly	Φ,	then	necessarily	possibly	Φ.
The	Kneales	report	that	C.I.	Lewis,	the	founder	of	modern	modal	logic,	
was	inclined	to	deny	that	each	instance	of	the	above	principles	holds,2 
while	Bennett	 remarks	 that	 their	 universal	 generalisations	 “have	 an	
unusually	irritating	quality,	in	that	there	appear	to	be	at	first	sight	pow-
erful	reasons	for	rejecting	[them],	and	at	the	same	time	equally	pow-
erful	ones	for	rejecting	their	contradictories”.3	Prior	notes	that	“many	
people	would	find	 [the	 view	 that	 (5)	 always	obtains]	 very	dubious”,	
although	he	is	tempted	to	accept	the	universal	forms	of	(B),	(4),	and	
(5),	because	modal	logics	without	formal	analogues	of	those	principles	
are	“clumsy”.4
More	 recently,	 Armstrong	 once	 denied	 that	 (B)	 and	 (5)	 always	
hold,5	while	we	will	see	below	that	Chandler	and	Salmon	have	force-
1.	 All	talk	of	“necessity”	in	what	follows	should	be	read	as	involving	the	stron-
gest	variety	of	alethic	necessity;	“possibility”	should	correspondingly	be	iden-
tified	with	the	weakest	type	of	alethic	possibility.	Throughout	what	follows,	
the	 “instances”	 of	 the	 various	 “principles”	 produced	 in	 the	 text	 are	meant	
to	be	all	and	only	those	propositions	of	a	suitable	sort;	so,	for	example,	the	
propositions	that	[if	necessarily	0=1,	then	necessarily	necessarily	0=1],	that	[if	
necessarily	1=2,	then	necessarily	necessarily	1=2],	…	are	among	the	instances	
of	(4)	below.
2.	 Kneale	and	Kneale	(1962),	pp.	551–2.		
3.	 Bennett	(1955),	p.	46	—	Bennett	eventually	concludes	that	each	instance	of	(5)	
holds.
4.	 See	Prior	(1962),	p.	198,	for	the	first	quotation	and	p.	205	for	the	second.
5.	 Armstrong	(1989),	pp.	62–3.	Armstrong	 later	concluded	(Armstrong	(1997),	
p.	170)	that	if	he	were	to	alter	his	position	appropriately	he	might	not	have	
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modal	logics	unless	they	thought	that	the	theorems	of	T	can	at	least	
sometimes	be	interpreted	as	expressing	truths.	But	where	φ	is	a	theo-
rem	of	T,	so	too	are	p φ	and	wφ	(and	hence	p pφ	and	p wφ	are	also	
theorems	of	T).	The	customary	focus	upon	modal	logics	which	extend	
T	thus	reflects	the	assumption	that	there	are	at	least	sometimes	non-
trivially	correct	instances	of	(B),	(4),	and	(5).
On	 the	one	hand,	 then,	 it	 is	unclear	 that	 (B),	 (4),	and	 (5)	always	
hold.	But,	on	the	other,	it	is	bizarre	to	think	that	there	are	no	choices	of	
Φ	which	yield	nontrivially	true	instances	of	(B),	(4),	and	(5).	Perhaps	
because	 it	 is	 far	 from	obvious	when	(B),	(4),	and	(5)	apply,	work	on	
iterated	modalities	 has	 tended	 to	 suffer	 from	 heavy	 theoretical	 bur-
dens	—	lacking	intuitive	starting	points,	philosophers	have	often	mere-
ly	tracked	the	consequences	of	their	favoured	theories	of	modality	for	
principles	featuring	iterated	modalities.11
That	situation	is	unsatisfying.	It	would	be	better	to	have	arguments	
for	principles	concerning	iterated	modalities	that	were	relatively	inde-
pendent	of	particular	theories	of	necessity	and	possibility.	While	plen-
ty	of	philosophers	have,	of	late,	constructed	jaw-droppingly	ambitious	
theories	of	modality,	seeking	for	instance	to	reduce	the	modal	to	the	
nonmodal	and	to	uncover	the	grounds	of	modal	truths,	the	elementary	
question	precisely	when	it	is	acceptable	repeatedly	to	apply	modal	op-
erators	has	been	sidelined.	Yet	until	we	know	the	answer	to	that	basic	
question,	or	until	we	feel	certain	that	its	answer	is	so	inaccessible	that	
the	question	can	fairly	be	ignored,	we	cannot	be	confident	that	we	are	
doing	enough	to	ensure	that	our	theories	of	modality	are	headed	in	
even	roughly	the	right	direction.12 
This	paper	examines	various	 theses	which	might	be	hoped	to	es-
tablish	that	modal	operators	can	be	iterated	under	certain	conditions,	
11.	 Chandler’s	and	Salmon’s	arguments	against	the	view	that	every	instance	of	
(4)	and	(5)	holds	are	important	exceptions,	however;	see	the	next	section	for	
an	example	of	the	sorts	of	cases	which	they	take	to	cast	doubt	upon	those	
principles.
12.	 I	am	assuming	in	what	follows	that	there	is	a	fact	of	the	matter	about	whether,	
for	example,	(4)	always	holds.	For	a	view	which	allows	one	to	deny	that	as-
sumption,	see	Gregory	(2006).
fully	argued	that	some	a	posteriori	necessities	generate	false	instances	
of	 (4)	and	 (5).6	Salmon	 reports	 that	Kripke	 is	 “nearly	 convinced”	by	
his	arguments7,	and	Peacocke	also	tentatively	supports	them.8	Finally,	
David	Lewis	denies	that	the	contents	expressed	by	open	sentences	of	
quantified	modal	languages	always	generate	true	instances	of	(B),	(4),	
and	(5),	because	he	denies	 that	 the	relation	of	counterparthood	has	
suitable	structural	features.9
All	that	name-dropping	surely	illustrates	that	it	is	not	obvious	that	
(B),	(4),	and	(5)	always	hold.	But	it	is	hard	to	accept	that	there	are	no 
nontrivially	correct	 instances	of	 those	principles;	 that	 is,	no	choices	
of	Φ which	make	true	both	the	antecedent	and	consequent	of	one	of	
(B),	(4),	and	(5).	Consider,	for	instance,	the	truth	that	2+2=4.	It	could	
have	been	impossible	that	2+2=4	only	if	it	could	have	been	necessary	
that	2+2≠4.	And	it	could	have	been	nonnecessary	that	2+2=4	only	if	it	
could	have	been	possible	that	2+2≠4.	But	it	is	tempting	to	suppose	that	
it	could	have	been	neither	necessary	nor	possible	that	2+2≠4.	Hence	
it	is	pretty	natural	to	think	that	it	is	necessarily	possible	and	necessar-
ily	necessary	that	2	+	2	=	4.	So	(B),	(4),	and	(5)	seem	to	be	nontrivially	
instanced	by	the	necessary	and	possible	truth	that	2	+	2	=	4.10
It	is	also	worth	noting	that	(B),	(4),	and	(5)	are	standardly	assumed	
to	apply	within	certain	domains.	When	philosophers	put	modal	logic	
to	work	 in	 their	 examinations	 or	 presentations	 of	modal	 reasoning,	
they	 invariably	 employ	 logics	 that	 extend	 the	 propositional	 modal	
logic	T.	Philosophers	presumably	would	not	concentrate	upon	those	
to	reject	(B)	and	(5)	after	all,	regarding	this	 for	some	unstated	reason	as	“a	
distinct	advantage”	of	the	proposed	alterations.
6.	 See,	for	instance,	Chandler	(1976)	and	Salmon	(1989).
7.	 See	footnote	12	of	Salmon	(1989).
8.	 See	Peacocke	(1999),	pp.	195–7.
9.	 Lewis	(1968),	p.	36.
10.	 Peacocke	writes,	 similarly,	 that	 “[i]n	 special	 cases,	 such	 as	 those	 in	which	
we	are	considering	only	a	restricted	vocabulary,	like	that	of	arithmetic,	it	is	
relatively	uncontroversial	 that	we	have	 arbitrary	necessitations”	 (Peacocke	
(1999),	p.	196).	See	also	Salmon	(1986),	p.	109	(quoted	at	the	start	of	the	fol-
lowing	section).
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(a)		 If	we	can	know	a	priori	 that	Φ	—	if	 it is a priori that	Φ,	 for	
short	—	and	if	necessarily	Φ,	then	necessarily	necessarily	Φ.
As	we	will	now	see,	(a)	is	at	least	untroubled	by	what	I	take	to	be	the	
only	apparent	counterexamples	to	(4),	various	a	posteriori	necessities	
considered	by	Salmon	himself.
So,	for	example,	many	people	would	accept,	in	the	light	of	Kripke’s	
discussions	of	origin,	that	“a	particular	material	artifact	—	say	a	particu-
lar	wooden	table	which	we	may	call	‘Woody’		—	could	have	originated	
from	matter	slightly	different	from	its	actual	original	matter	m*	…	but	
not	from	entirely	different	matter”.	But	“it	would	seem	that	…	we	may	
select	 some	…	matter	m	 such	 that,	although	Woody	could	not	have	
originated	from	m, m	is	close	enough	to	being	a	possibility	for	Woody	
that	if	Woody	had originated	from	certain	matter	m’	that	is in fact	possi-
ble	for	Woody	—	matter	differing	in	as	many	molecules	from	the	actual	
original	matter	m*	as	possible,	and	sharing	as	many	molecules	with	m 
as	possible,	while	remaining	a	possibility	 for	Woody	—	then	 it	would 
have been possible	for	Woody	to	have	originated	from	m,	even	though	
it	is	not	actually possible”.15
If	the	previous	example	holds	water,	though,	it	follows	that	the	nec-
essary	truth	that	Woody	is	not	made	from	m	is	not	necessarily	neces-
sary,	which	clashes	with	the	view	that	each	instance	of	(4)	holds.	(It	
also	clashes	with	the	claim	that	each	instance	of	(5)	holds:	as	illustrat-
ed	by	the	relationships	between	the	modal	logics	S4	and	S5,	the	truth	
of	each	instance	of	(5),	combined	with	the	fact	that	necessity	implies	
truth,	requires	the	truth	of	each	instance	of	(4).)	But	the	case	clearly	
does	not	present	any	problems	for	the	restricted	version	of	(4)	flowing	
from	(a)	above.	For	(a)’s	always	obtaining	merely	requires	that	those	
necessities	which	are	knowable	a	priori	are	necessarily	necessary;	and	
the	truth	that	Woody	is	made	from	m*	is	something	that	can	only	be	
known	a	posteriori.	
As	a	more	restrictive	alternative	to	(a),	however,	one	might	suspect	
that	those	truths	whose necessity is knowable a priori are	subject	to	(4).	
15.	 Both	quotations	from	Salmon	(1989),	p.	5.	
where	the	relevant	theses	are	designed	to	respond	to	a	particular	range	
of	putative	counterexamples	to	the	claim	that	all	of	the	instances	of	(4)	
and	(5)	are	true.13	To	some	extent,	the	paper	ends	as	it	has	begun,	with	
a	range	of	hunches	about	iterated	modalities	but	no	watertight	argu-
ments	with	which	those	intuitions	can	be	backed	up.	But	the	interven-
ing	discussion	will	at	 least	have	articulated	one	very	promising	way	
of	supporting	a	host	of	uses	of	(B),	(4),	and	(5),	using	principles	that	
do	not	specifically	concern	iterated	modalities.	And	it	will	have	estab-
lished	some	notable	connections	between	the	described	strategy	and	
some	 significant	general	questions	about	 the	 relationships	between	
modality,	meaning	and	the	a	priori.
II
Salmon	writes,	in	relation	to	(4)	above:
[T]here	may	be	special	cases	of	necessity	iteration	[infer-
ences	 of	 the	 form	 ‘necessarily,	Φ;	 so	 necessarily	 neces-
sarily	Φ’]	that	are	logically	valid.	For	example,	it	may	be	
that	[as	an	argument	of	Forbes’s	suggests]	necessity	itera-
tion	is	legitimate	whenever	the	proposition	in	question	is	
necessary	by	virtue	of	being	a priori.	Certainly,	necessity	
iteration	 is	 legitimate	with	 respect	 to	purely	mathemati-
cal	propositions	and	(classical)	logical	truths.14
Perhaps,	then,	each	instance	of	the	following	holds:
13.	 It	is	worth	noting	that	the	following	discussion	therefore	effectively	ignores	
some	others	sorts	of	concerns	which	philosophers	of	certain	stripes	may	have	
with	regard	to	principles	featuring	iterated	modalities.	So,	conventionalist	ac-
counts	of	modality	 lead	fairly	naturally	 to	denials	 that	each	instance	of	(B),	
(4),	and	(5)	holds	(see,	for	example,	Bennett’s	discussion	of	Carnap’s	views	on	
iterated	modalities,	on	pp.	46–8	of	Bennett	(1955)),	but	I	will	not	attempt	to	
address	those	worries	in	this	paper.	(Many	thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	
for	this	journal	for	emphasising	this	point.)
14.	 Salmon	(1986),	p.	109.	Salmon’s	remarks	may	contain	an	implicit	restriction	to	
certain	kinds	of	propositions,	however,	because	he	earlier	mentions	certain	
“somewhat	rare	and,	for	present	purposes	irrelevant,	exceptions”	to	Forbes’s	
view	that	“conceptual	a priority entails	metaphysical	necessity”	(p.	108).
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see	this,	just	suppose	that	possibly	(actually	necessarily	Φ	and	not-Φ)	
and	derive	a	contradiction.)
Note	next,	and	in	the	light	of	the	previous	point,	that	(a)	and	(b)	
both	imply	that	each	instance	of	(α)	is	a	necessarily	necessary	truth.	
For,	 as	 just	 noted,	 it	 is	 a	 priori	—	and	 therefore	 true	—	that	 any	 in-
stance	of	 (α)	holds	necessarily,	and	hence	also	a	priori	 that	each	 in-
stance	of	 (α)	 is	simply	 true.	But	we	can	 therefore	plug	any	 instance	
of	 (α)	 into	one	of	 (a)	or	 (b)	 to	 get	 that	 the	 relevant	 instance	of	 (α)	
	is	necessarily	necessary.	
Now	suppose	that	P	generates	a	false	instance	of	(4);	suppose,	that	
is,	 that	 it	 is	necessary	that	P	although	it	 is	not	necessarily	necessary	
that	P.	If	necessarily	P,	then	actually	necessarily	P;	so	actually	neces-
sarily	P.	But	if	actually	Φ,	then	it	is	necessarily	necessary	that	actually	
Φ.	(For	if	Φ	holds	at	world w	then,	for	any	world	y,	it	is	true	at	y	than	
Φ	holds	at	w;	and	[it	is	actually	the	case	that	Φ]	just	in	case	Φ	holds	at	
the	actual	world.)	Hence,	in	particular,	it	is	necessarily	necessary	that	
it	is	actually	necessary	that	P.
Now,	it	is	necessarily	necessary	that	it	is	actually	necessary	that	P;	
but	it	is	not	necessarily	necessary	that	P.	Hence	there	is	a	possibly	pos-
sible	world	w	at	which	P is	false	yet	at	which	the	claim	that	it	is	actually	
necessary	that	P holds.	But,	at	w,	the	conditional	claim	that	(if	actually	
necessarily	P,	then	P)	will	be	false.	So	it	is	not	necessarily	necessary	
that	(if	it	is	actually	necessary	that	P	then	P);	that	is,	we	have	a	claim	of	
form	(α)	which	is	not	necessarily	necessary.	
Given	our	choice	of	P,	then,	we	have	an	instance	of	(α)	which	is	not	
necessarily	necessary;	and	 that	contradicts	 the	claim	that	one	of	 (a)	
and	(b)	always	holds.	More	generally,	we	have	just	seen	that,	granted	
some	standard	assumptions,	some	instances	of	(a)	and	(b)	are	false	if	
some	proposition	 is	necessary	but	not	necessarily	necessary.	So	nei-
ther	(a)	nor	(b)	can	help	us	 in	our	search	for	a	restricted	domain	of	
propositions	within	which	we	can	safely	rely	upon	(4)	above.17	Similar	
17.	 The	 instance	of	 (α)	envisaged	 in	 the	 text	 creates	difficulties	 for	a	 range	of	
further	 restrictions	 of	 (4)	 that	might	 be	 proposed.	 For	 example,	 someone	
might	 suggest	 that	 any	 necessary	 statement	 which	 can	 be	 deduced	 using	
One	might	conjecture,	 that	 is,	 that	each	 instance	of	 the	 following	 is	
correct:
(b)	 If	it	is	a	priori	that	necessarily	Φ,	then	necessarily	necessar-
ily	Φ.
If	 either	 (a)	 or	 (b)	 always	 hold	—	and	 (a)’s	 always	 obtaining	 is	 suffi-
cient	 for	(b)’s	holding	universally,	because	knowledge	 is	 factive	and	
we	know	a	priori	that	what	is	necessary	is	true	—	we	can	safely	assume	
(4)	within	certain	restricted	contexts.	We	know	a	priori	that	2+2=4	and	
that	necessarily	2+2=4,	for	instance,	so	both	(a)	and	(b)	give	us	that	it	
is	necessarily	necessary	that	2+2=4.
Now,	it	is	worth	noting	that	standard	examples	of	contingent	a	pri-
ori	truths,	like	the	claim	that	grass	is	actually	green	just	in	case	grass	is	
green,	do	not	create	any	problems	for	(a)	and	(b).	For	(a)	only	applies	
necessity	iteration	to	a	priori	necessities,	while	(b)	only	applies	it	to	
those	truths	whose	necessity	is	knowable a	priori.	And	contingent	a	
priori	truths	certainly	fall	into	neither	of	those	categories.	But	contin-
gent	a	priori	truths	undermine	the	general	view	that	what	is	a	priori	
is	also	necessary,	and	an	awareness	of	that	fact	might	make	one	wary	
of	endorsing	each	instance	of	(a)	and	(b).	For	it	is	hard	to	see	why	the	
class	of	contingent	a	priori	truths	should	not	include	some	ascriptions	
of	necessity.	Yet	if	some	truth	of	the	form	‘necessarily,	Φ’	is	both	con-
tingent	and	a	priori,	some	instances	of	(a)	and	(b)	are	false.
The	preceding	worry	is	merely	programmatic,	but	it	can	be	made	
more	substantial.	Consider	the	following:
(α)	 If	actually	necessarily	Φ,	then	Φ.
We	know	a	priori	 that,	 if	 actually	necessarily	Φ, then	necessarily	Φ.	
But	we	also	know	a	priori	that	[actually	Φ	just	in	case	possibly	actually	
Φ].16	Putting	those	things	together	provides	us	with	an	a	priori	demon-
stration	that	necessarily	[if	actually	necessarily	Φ,	then	Φ]	—	with	an	a	
priori	demonstration	that	each	instance	of	(a)	is	a	necessary	truth.	(To	
16.	 I	am	here	reading	‘actually’	as	a	rigidifier;	for	more	on	the	rigidifying	function	
of	‘actually’	and	related	issues,	plus	further	references,	see	Gregory	(2001).	
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Let’s	 say	 that	 a	 context is	 being	 taken	 as	 the	 context of a	 certain	
(disambiguated	and	declarative)	sentence’s	occurrence	 if	 it	 is	 the	con-
text	which	is	being	used	to	fix	the	semantic	values	of	the	sentence’s 
context-dependent	 elements	 and	 whose	 containing	 world	 is	 being	
taken	as	actual;	sentences	express	propositions	relative	to	contexts	of	
occurrence.19	Contexts	of	occurrence	contrast	with	contexts	of	evalua-
tion:	where	proposition	P	is	expressed	by	a	given	sentence	relative	to	
a	given	context	of	occurrence,	the	context of evaluation	 is	the	context	
relative	to	which	the	truth	of	P	is	being	evaluated.	So,	for	instance,	the	
proposition	that	the	sentence	‘You	are	there	now’	expresses	relative	to	
a	suitable	context	of	occurrence	c	holds	at	context	of	evaluation	d just	
in	case,	at	d,	the	referent	supplied	by	c for	‘You’	occupies	the	place	sup-
plied	as	the	referent	for	‘there’	by	c at	the	time	supplied	as	the	referent	
for	‘now’	by	c.
Suppose	that	we	are	given	a	sentence	containing	‘actually’.	On	ac-
count	 of	 its	 containing	 ‘actually’,	 the	 sentence will express	 different	
propositions	relative	to	any	two	contexts	of	occurrence	which	are	lo-
cated	in	distinct	worlds.	Can	we	improve	upon	(a)	and	(b)	by	some-
how	restricting	our	attention	to	the	propositions	which	are	expressed	
by	sentences	which	lack	that	kind	of	contextual	variability?
A	 sentence	S	 is	 constant	 just	 in	 case	 there	 is	 some	proposition	P 
which	is	such	that,	for	any	possible	context	c	taken	as	the	context	of	
occurrence,	S	expresses	P	relative	to	c. And	sentence	S	is	a	priori	just	
in	case	a	suitable	process	of	reasoning	might	lead	someone	to	accept	S 
and	thereby	to	a	priori	knowledge	of	what	S	expresses,	where	the	per-
son’s	context	is	being	taken	as	the	context	of	occurrence.	Then	here	is	
an	attempt	in	the	direction	described	at	the	end	of	the	last	paragraph:
close	of	the	previous	section,	which	can	be	used	to	create	problems	for	(c)	
and	(d).
19.	 What	follows	is	a	bit	rough;	I	am	basically	assuming	that	the	reader	is	familiar	
with	and	not	entirely	unsympathetic	to	the	“two	dimensional”	distinction	that	
I	am	about	to	introduce.	For	a	much	fuller	treatment	of	lots	of	relevant	mate-
rial,	plus	further	references,	see	Chalmers	(2006);	Kaplan	(1989),	pp.	493–5	
and	section	VI;	plus	Jackson	(1998),	pp.	46–62.
points	apply	to	the	following,	which	one	might	hope	to	use	in	identify-
ing	restricted	regions	within	which	(B)	and	(5)	may	be	applied:
(c)	 If	it	is	a	priori	that	Φ,	then	necessarily	possibly	Φ.
(d)	 If it	is	a	priori	that	possibly	Φ,	then	necessarily	possibly	Φ.
For	an	instance	of	(c)	is	false	if	some	P is	true	but	not	necessarily	possi-
ble	(to	see	this,	consider	‘if	P	is	actually	true	then	P’),	while	an	instance	
of	(d)	is	false	if	some	P is	possible	but	not	necessarily	possible	(to	see	
this,	consider	‘if	P	is	actually	possible	then	P’).
III
Students	of	the	paraphernalia	surrounding	contingent	a	priori	truths	
may	not	have	been	startled	by	the	points	made	in	the	previous	section:	
claims	 expressed	 using	 ‘actually’	 operators	 and	 related	 semantic	 de-
vices	tend	to	create	problems	for	simple	attempts	to	connect	epistemic	
features	to	modal	ones.	Maybe,	therefore,	we	will	be	able	to	identify	
unproblematic	restrictions	of	(B),	(4),	and	(5)	by	paying	closer	atten-
tion	to	the	workings	of	those	sorts	of	semantic	devices.18
conceptually	underwritten	inferences	from	some	conceptual	truths	is	neces-
sarily	necessary,	or	that	any	statement	whose	necessity	can	be	deduced	using	
conceptually	underwritten	inferences	from	some	conceptual	truths	is	neces-
sarily	necessary.	Although	those	proposals	cannot	be	fully	assessed	without	
some	fuller	account	of	their	central	notions,	there	are	reasons	for	doubting	
that	they	will	win	through.	For	the	necessitation	of	(α)	can	be	demonstrated	
using	entirely	elementary	resources,	ones	that	seem	to	be	natural	candidates	
for	analyticity.	
18.	 Why	not	 sidestep	 the	problems	which	 (α)	made	 for	 (a)	 and	 (b)	by	 simply	
restricting	the	admissible	instance	of	the	latter	to	ones	featuring	statements	
whose	expression	doesn’t	require	the	use	of	‘actually’?	It	is	fairly	straightfor-
ward	to	produce	(α)-like	cases	which	do	not	feature	 ‘actually’	operators,	by	
setting	up	appropriate	 reference-fixing	 stipulations	 for	 rigid	designators	 in	
the	manner	of	Tharp	(1989).	For	instance,	suppose	that	P	is	necessary	but	not	
necessarily	necessary.	Now	fix	the	reference	of	the	rigid	designator	‘Atled’	as	
follows:	‘Atled’	refers	to	0	in	any	situation	if	P	is	actually	necessary,	and	to	1	
otherwise.	Then,	just	as	we	can	demonstrate	the	necessity	of	each	instance	of	
(α)	a	priori,	so	we	can	provide	an	a	priori	demonstration	of	the	necessity	of	
(β)	‘Atled	=	0	only	if	P’.	Yet	(β)	is	not	necessarily	necessary,	because	P	is	not	
necessarily	necessary.	Similar	points	apply	to	the	examples	mentioned	at	the	
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Principle	 (e)	 thus	 looks	 like	 a	 nice	 starting-point	 for	 attempts	 to	
reckon	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 realms	within	which	 (B),	 (4),	 and	 (5)	 hold	
sway.	But	why	would	anyone	accept	it?
IV
Here	is	a	quick	argument	for	(e).	Suppose	that	sentence S	is	a	priori.	
As	S	 is	a	priori,	S	expresses	a	 truth	relative	to	each	possible	context	
of	 occurrence.	 But	 assume	 that	S	 is	 constant,	 stating	 that	P	 relative	
to	 each	 possible	 context	when	 that	 context	 is	 taken	 as	 the	 context	
of	occurrence.	Then	P	must	be	necessary,	being	 true	 relative	 to	any	
possible	 context	 of	 occurrence.	 I	will	 not	 attempt	 to	 settle	 here	 the	
question	whether	that	argument	is	sound;	I	will	merely	limit	myself	to	
identifying	the	hard	issues	that	must	be	addressed	if	that	question	is	
to	be	answered.
A	crucial	move	in	the	above	argument	clearly	occurs	when	it	em-
ploys	the	following	general	thesis	about	the	a	priori:
(f)	 Each	a	priori	sentence	S	expresses	a	truth	relative	to	each	
possible	context,	when	that	context	is	taken	as	the	context	
of	occurrence.
Principle	 (f)	was	 once	 supported	 by	 Stalnaker,21	 and	 it	 has	 recently	
been	endorsed	by	Chalmers,	who	states	that	“[i]t	is	clear	that	when	S 
is	a	priori,	it	will	have	a	necessary	primary	intension”.22
A	quick	 survey	of	examples	 speaks	 in	 (f)’s	 favour.	Thus	consider	
that	is	necessary,	necessarily	necessary	…),	deriving	the	conclusion	that	what	
is	expressed	by	each	of	those	universally	quantified	claims	is	necessary	and	
necessarily	necessary	…	But	this	will	only	allow	one	to	derive	the	necessity	
and	necessary	necessity	…	of	what	is	stated	by	the	nonconstant	instances	of	
T’s	axioms	if	one	assumes	that	the	domain	of	actual	propositions	is	a	subset	of	
each	possible,	possibly	possible	…	domain	of	propositions.	Perhaps	this	can	
be	shown,	but	I	do	not	know	how	to	show	it.
21.	 See	Stalnaker’s	comments	on	the	“square	dagger”	operator	on	p.	83	of	Stal-
naker	(1978).	I	am	not	sure	what	Stalnaker’s	attitude	towards	(f)	would	now	
be,	however;	 see	Stalnaker	 (2001).	Davies	and	Humberstone	also	 seem	 to	
find	(f)	fairly	plausible	(Davies	and	Humberstone	(1980),	p.	10).
22.	Chalmers	(2002),	p.	164.
(e)	 Where	constant	and	a	priori	sentence	S	states	that	Φ	rela-
tive	to	each	possible	context	of	occurrence,	necessarily	Φ.
So,	take	the	sentence	‘2	+	2	=	4’.	That	sentence	is	constant	and	a	priori.	
The	proposition	which	 it	expresses	 is	also	necessary.	By	way	of	con-
trast,	consider	‘necessarily,	if	it	is	actually	necessary	that	2	+	2	=	4,	then	
2	+	2	=	4’.	That	 sentence	 is	 a	priori	but	 it	 is	not	 constant,	because	of	
the	 occurrence	 of	 ‘actually’	 within	 the	 sentence.	 Principle	 (e)	 there-
fore	does	not	imply	the	necessity	of	the	proposition	expressed	by	the	
previous	sentence,	relative	to	our	context	as	the	context	of	occurrence.	
More	generally,	 the	previous	section’s	arguments	relating	 to	(a)	and	
(b)	—	which	 focused	 upon	 the	 propositions	 expressed	 by	 sentences	
containing	‘actually’	—	do	not	affect	principle	(e).
Principle	(e)	looks	set	to	justify	very	many	applications	of	(B),	(4),	
and	 (5).	 For	 instance,	 ‘it	 is	 necessary	 that	 there	 are	 infinitely	many	
primes’	 and	 ‘it	 is	possible	 that	 there	are	 infinitely	many	primes’	 are	
constant	sentences;	and	they	 look	 to	be	a	priori.	So	(e)	 licenses	 the	
conclusion	 that	 it	 is	 necessarily	 necessary	 and	 necessarily	 possible	
that	there	are	infinitely	many	primes.	One	can	also	use	(e)	in	arguing	
that	the	theorems	of	the	propositional	modal	logic	T	always	express	
truths,	so	long	as	any	atomic	sentences	occurring	within	those	theo-
rems	are	interpreted	using	constant	sentences;	so	(e)	implies	that	very	
many	uses	of	modal	logics	which	include	T	are	fair	enough.20
20.	Assume,	first,	that	our	knowledge	of	whether	sentences	are	a	priori	and	con-
stant	is	itself	a	priori.	Suppose,	second,	that	the	various	instances	of	(e)	above	
which	result	from	plugging	in	constant	sentences	for	‘S’	are	themselves	con-
stant	and	a	priori	(their	being	a	priori	would	be	assured	by	the	soundness	of	
the	argument	for	(e)	given	in	the	next	section).	Third,	note	that,	where	S	is	
constant,	so	too	is	‘necessarily	S’.	Finally,	note	that	each	instance	of	an	axiom	
of	T	which	results	 from	interpreting	each	of	 the	atomic	sentences	which	 it	
contains	using	a	constant	sentence	—	each	constant	instance	of	T’s	axioms	—	is	
constant	and	a	priori.	It	then	follows	that	what	is	stated	by	any	constant	in-
stance	 of	 T’s	 theorems	 is	 necessary	 and	 necessarily	 necessary	 and	…	The	
preceding	reasoning	cannot	simply	be	run	on	nonconstant	 instances	of	T’s	
theorems,	however.	One	might	try	to	work	around	this	issue	by	revising	the	
preceding	argument	so	that	it	concentrates	upon	universally	quantified	ver-
sions	of	T’s	axioms	(so	one	would	note	that,	for	example,	the	sentence	‘each	
necessary	truth	is	true’	is	a	priori	and	constant	and	so	expresses	something	
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currence.	For	example,	she	may	use	Williamson’s	method	to	form	the	
belief	that	there	is	a	believer.25
The	 previous	 putative	 counterexample	 to	 (f)	may	 be	 challenged,	
of	course.	One	might	reasonably	question	the	reliabilist	 inclinations	
which	most	naturally	underwrite	 the	 idea	 that	Williamson’s	method	
produces	knowledge,	for	instance.	But	it	is	nonetheless	clear	that	(f)	
is	far	from	trivial,	however	plausible	it	may	seem	to	be	at	first	glance.
V
Before	 concluding,	 I	 wish	 briefly	 to	 examine	 an	 elegant	 argu-
ment,	 owed	 to	 Ross	 Cameron,	 that	 bears	 upon	 various	 aspects	 of	
the	previous	discussion.26
It	is	widely	thought	that	our	knowledge	of	a	posteriori	necessities	
is	 always	 backed	 up	 by	 corresponding	 a	 priori	 conditionals.	 Kripke	
writes,	for	example,	that	“if	P is	the	[supposedly	necessary	a	posteriori]	
statement	that	 the	 lectern	is	not	made	of	 ice,	one	knows	by	a	priori	
philosophical	analysis,	what	is	expressed	by	some	conditional	of	the	
form	‘if	P, then	necessarily	P’”.27	Or,	to	take	another	example,	we	know	
a	priori	that	if	Hesperus	is	Phosphorus	then	it	is	necessary	that	Hes-
perus	is	Phosphorus,	although	we	cannot	know	a	priori	that	Hesperus	
is	Phosphorus.	Assume	that	the	necessary	a	posteriori	is	indeed	like	
that	—	or,	as	I’ll	put	it,	assume	that	the	necessity	of	necessary	a	poste-
riori	truths	always	has	a	priori support.
Suppose	 that	we	 are	 given	 some	 sentence	S expressing	 the	 nec-
essary	a	posteriori	truth	P,	where	the	necessity	of	P receives	a	priori	
support	 from	 the	 conditional	 ‘if	S,	 then	necessarily	S’.	And	 suppose	
that	the	previous	conditional	is	not	merely	a	priori	but	is	constant	and	
25.	 See	Hawthorne	(2002)	for	a	fairly	recent	discussion	of	Williamson’s	example	
and	a	range	of	other	nonmodal	cases	that	sit	uneasily	with	(f).
26.	Cameron	presented	the	ensuing	argument	in	the	questions	following	a	talk	
which	I	gave	based	around	an	earlier	version	of	the	current	paper.	More	gen-
erally,	I	am	particularly	indebted	in	this	section	both	to	Cameron,	who	has	
provided	me	with	very	helpful	comments	on	 it	 subsequent	 to	 the	 talk	 just	
mentioned,	and	to	one	of	the	anonymous	referees	for	this	journal.
27.	 Kripke	(1971),	p.	153.
the	following	a	priori	sentences:	‘2	+	2	=	4’,	‘everything	is	self-identical’,	
and	(more	controversially)	‘if	there	is	a	unique	inventor	of	the	zip	then	
Julius	is	the	inventor	of	the	zip’.23	For	my	own	part,	I	am	strongly	in-
clined	to	hold	that	each	of	those	sentences	expresses	a	truth	relative	
to	any	possible	context	of	occurrence.	It	is	worth	remarking,	though,	
that	each	of	the	examples	drawn	upon	in	the	preceding	straw-poll	was	
nonmodal.	And	this	suggests	a	retort	that	one	might	make	to	(f):	one	
might	argue	that,	while	a	restricted	version	of	(f)	does	apply	to	nonmo-
dal sentences,	(f)	fails	just	because	it	covers	modal sentences	as	well.
Unadorned	as	 it	 is,	 that	objection	 is	weak.	Principle	(f)	 is	appeal-
ing	 because	 it	 harmonises	with	 an	 intuitive	 picture	 of	 how	 a	 priori	
knowers	relate	to	their	environments:	they	are,	for	epistemologically	
relevant	purposes,	disconnected	from	their	surroundings,	and	hence	
their	 internal	 enunciations	 of	 items	 of	 a	 priori	 knowledge	must	 ex-
press	truths	in	all	possible	contexts	of	occurrence	if	they	express	truths	
in	any.	But	that	picture	does	not	distinguish	between	different	catego-
ries	of	a	priori	knowledge.	So	why	should	a	sentence’s	status	as	modal	
have	 any	more	 bearing	 on	whether	 it	 is	 subject	 to	 (f)	 than,	 say,	 its	
status	as	disjunctive?
Those	who	doubt	 (f)	would	do	better	 to	question	 its	 application	
even	to	nonmodal	sentences.	And	there	is	more	obscurity	surround-
ing	these	matters	than	may	immediately	be	apparent.
For	instance,	suppose	that	somebody	forms	beliefs	in	accordance	
with	 the	 following,	 seemingly	 a	 priori,	method:	 one	 should	believe	
those	propositions	P that	one	can	validly	deduce	a	priori	from	the	as-
sumption	that	somebody	believes	P.	Then,	as	Williamson	(the	meth-
od’s	originator)	points	out,24	the	previous	method	is	very	reliable:	each	
belief	 that	 the	 person	 forms	 using	 the	method	 is	 guaranteed	 to	 be	
correct;	and	so,	one	might	 think,	 those	beliefs	 count	as	known.	But	
some	of	the	sentences	that	our	individual	would	use	to	formulate	her	
conclusions	express	false	propositions	relative	to	some	contexts	of	oc-
23.	Where,	 following	Evans	 (1982),	p.	 31,	 ‘Julius’	 is	 a	name	whose	 reference	 is	
fixed	using	the	description	‘the	inventor	of	the	zip’.
24.	Williamson	(1986),	p.	114.	
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hence	not	knowable	a	priori,	that	if	Woody	did	not	originate	from	m’	
then	it	is	necessary	that	Woody	did	not	originate	from	m’.	But,	given	
that	 the	previous	conditional	 is	 false,	 it	could	hardly	be	knowable	a	
priori	that	if	Woody	did	not	originate	from	m	then	it	is	necessary	that	
Woody	did	not	originate	from	m,	even	though	that	last	conditional	is	
true;	we	cannot	know	a	priori	that	Woody’s	relationship	to	m’	is	sub-
stantially	different	from	its	relationship	to	m’.29 
While	 those	points	 are	fine	as	 far	 as	 they	go,	 they	do	not	go	 far	
enough.	For,	while	the	necessity	of	‘Woody	did	not	originate	from	m 
may	not	 receive	 a	 priori	 support	 from	 a	 suitable	 conditional	which	
has	 that	 very	 statement	 as	 its	 antecedent,	 it	 surely	 does	 receive	 a	
priori	 support	 from	 another	 conditional	 whose	 antecedent	 is	 not	
	knowable	a	priori.
So,	 for	example,	 it	seems	that	we	do	know	a	priori	 that	 [if	m*	 is	
largely	distinct	from	m	and	Woody	originated	from	m*,	then	it	is	nec-
essary	that	Woody	did	not	originate	from	m].	Yet	if	the	a	priori	condi-
tional	just	stated	is	slotted	into	a	slightly	revised	version	of	Cameron’s	
argument	—	one	which	works	with	a	priori	conditionals	whose	ante-
cedents	are	perhaps	distinct	from	the	necessitated	claims	contained	in	
their	consequents	—	the	soundness	of	 the	resulting	argument	would	
again	give	 the	necessary	necessity	of	 the	 claim	 that	Woody	did	not	
originate	from	m.
Now,	the	arguments	most	obviously	resulting	from	the	preceding	
manouevre	are	unproblematic.	For	example,	and	in	the	very	case	just	
sketched,	 the	envisaged	argument	would	need	 to	proceed	 from	 the	
supposed	necessity	of	[if	m*	is	largely	distinct	from	m	and	Woody	orig-
inated	from	m*,	then	it	is	necessary	that	Woody	did	not	originate	from	
m]	and	the	necessity	of	[m*	is	largely	distinct	from	m	and	Woody	origi-
nated	 from	m*]	 to	 the	conclusion	that	[it	 is	necessary	 that	necessar-
ily,	Woody	did	not	originate	from	m].	Yet	anyone	who	finds	Salmon’s	
29.	Here	 I	 am	 indebted	 to	 an	 anonymous	 referee	 for	 this	 journal,	 for	 voicing	
the	suspicion	that	cases	like	Woody	might	in	fact	be	taken	to	provide	appar-
ent	counterexamples	to	the	idea	that	the	necessity	of	necessary	a	posteriori	
truths	always	has	a	priori	support	in	the	sense	suggested	by	Kripke.	
hence,	by	(e)	above,	expresses	a	necessary	truth.28	The	necessity	of	the	
claim	that	[if	P, then	necessarily	P]	implies	the	truth	of	the	claim	that	
[if	necessarily	P,	 then	necessarily	necessarily	P].	But,	by	assumption,	
it	 is	 necessary	 that	P.	Hence	necessarily	necessarily	P.	And	 so	—	de-
spite	Salmon’s	claims	to	the	contrary	and	despite	this	paper’s	earlier	
tendency	to	give	a	hearing	to	his	arguments	—	necessary	a	posteriori	
truths	are	in	fact	necessarily	necessary.
How	 to	 respond?	One	 relevant	 initial	 point	 is	 that	 some	at	 least	
of	 Chandler’s	 and	 Salmon’s	 putative	 counterexamples	 to	 the	 claim	
that	necessities	are	always	necessarily	necessary	will	also	provide,	to	
those	 who	 find	 them	 at	 all	 convincing,	 apparent	 counterexamples	
to	the	idea	that	a	posteriori	necessities	always	have	a	priori	support	
in	 the	 sense	 just	 explained.	 So,	 to	 return	 to	 the	 example	 rehearsed	
in	 section	 II,	 above,	 reconsider	 the	necessary	a	posteriori	 truth	 that	
Woody	did	not	originate	from	the	matter	m.	Do	we	know	a	priori	that	
if	Woody	did	not	originate	from	m	then	it	is	necessary	that	Woody	did	
not	originate	from	m?
If	one	accepts	one	of	the	starting	points	of	Salmon’s	example	—	that	
Woody	did	not	originate	from	the	intermediate	matter	m’,	yet	Woody	
might	have	originated	from	m’	—	one	should	surely	return	a	negative	
answer	to	that	question.	For	one	should	then	accept	that	it	is	false,	and	
28.	One	way	of	blocking	 this	 inference	 to	necessity	would	be	 to	appeal	 to	 the	
idea	 that	 the	conditional	 just	cited	 is	not	constant,	on	 the	grounds	 that	 its	
constituent	S is	not	constant.	The	nonconstancy	of	S —given	that	S	in	fact	ex-
presses	a	necessary	truth	and	is	not	a	priori—	would	follow	from	the	truth	of	
the	following	principle:	(g)	any	sentence	which	expresses	a	truth	relative	to	
any	possible	context,	when	that	context	is	taken	as	the	context	of	occurrence,	
is	a	priori.	But	is	(g)	true?	Although,	to	echo	Davies	and	Humberstone,	(g)	
isn’t	obviously	correct,	Stalnaker	seems	once	to	have	thought	that	(g)	holds,	
while	Chalmers	argues	for	the	principle.	(See,	for	example,	Chalmers	(2002),	
pp.	189	–	94.	Davies	and	Humberstone	say	on	p.	10	of	their	(1980)	that	“it	is	
not	obviously	correct	to	say	that	all	deeply	necessary	truths	are	knowable	a	
priori”.	Stalnaker	says	on	p.	83	of	his	(1978)	that	“[a]n	a	priori	truth	is	a	state-
ment	that	…	expresses	a	truth	in	every	context”.)	I	must	confess	that	I	do	not	
know	of	any	decisive	arguments	for	or	against	(g);	the	question	whether	(g)	
holds	is	an	important	question	concerning	the	relationships	between	the	a	
priori	and	the	modal.	Again,	though,	it	is	a	question	that	does	not	have	any-
thing	specifically	to	do	with	iterated	modalities.
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VI
Principles	 featuring	 iterated	 modalities	 are	 notoriously	 baffling.	 It	
is	very	hard	 to	make	progress	on	 the	question	whether	possibilities	
are	necessarily	possible,	for	example,	by	mentally	gazing	at	possible	
truths	and	asking	whether	they	are	necessary.	As	we	saw	earlier,	one	
common	way	of	responding	to	this	quandary	is	 to	construct	a	philo-
sophical	theory	of	modality	and	to	let	the	iterated	modalities	take	care	
of	themselves.
The	overarching	aim	of	 this	paper	has	been	 to	 illustrate	 another,	
less	despairing	way	of	approaching	the	problems	which	iterated	mo-
dalities	present.	Although	the	previous	discussion	manifestly	has	not	
established	whether	 (B),	 (4),	 and	 (5)	 can	ever	 safely	be	used,	 it	has	
shown	how	to	derive	a	positive	answer	 to	 that	question	 from	an	af-
firmative	answer	 to	other	—	admittedly	hard	—	questions	 in	which	 it-
erated	modalities	play	no	special	role.	The	resulting	perspective	per-
haps	makes	iterated	modalities	seem	less	interesting	than	they	appear	
when	they	are	left	in	splendid	isolation,	but	it	also	makes	them	look	
more	tractable,	which	can	only	be	a	good	thing.
Someone	might	complain,	I	suppose,	that	the	previous	discussion	
does	not	 provide	 the	materials	 for	 providing	 a	 deep	 explanation	of	
why	 (4),	 say,	 should	 be	 applicable	 to	 certain	 types	 of	 propositions.	
The	more	common	strategy	of	constructing	a	theory	of	modality	and	
checking	 its	 consequences	 for	 iterated	 modalities	 may,	 by	 contrast,	
hold	out	the	promise	of	explaining	why	modal	operators	can	or	can-
not	be	 iterated	 in	 certain	 contexts.	But	we	need	 to	do	 things	 in	 the	
right	order	—	before	we	construct	putative	explanations	of	facts	about	
iterated	modalities	we	should	do	our	best	 to	ascertain	the	 facts	 that	
need	explaining.	This	paper	was	merely	intended	to	contribute	to	the	
latter	task.32
Salmon	are	correct	about	the	cases	which	they	consider,	the	resulting	a	priori	
conditionals	merely	express	contingent	truths.		
32.	Many	thanks	to	Ross	Cameron,	John	Divers	and	Rosanna	Keefe	for	their	very	
helpful	comments	on	earlier	versions	of	this	paper.	Many	thanks	also	to	the	
audiences	at	Bristol,	Leeds	and	St	Andrews,	who	heard	earlier	versions	of	this	
example	 appealing	will	 deny	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 that	 [m*	 is	 largely	
distinct	from	m	and	Woody	originated	from	m*],	because	that	person	
will	think	that	Woody	did	not	have	to	originate	from	m*;	Woody	might	
also	have	originated	from	m’.30
At	this	point,	though,	one	might	move	to	a	more	refined	range	of	
arguments,	by	invoking	‘actually’	operators.	So,	
	 [if	m*	 is	 largely	 distinct	 from	m	 and	Woody	 actually	 originated	
from	m*,	then	it	is	necessary	that	Woody	did	not	originate	from	m].	But	
Woody	actually	originated	from	m*,	so	it	is	necessary	that	Woody	actu-
ally	originated	from	m*;	and	it	is	necessary	that	the	hunks	of	matter	m 
and	m*	are	largely	distinct.	The	necessity	of	[if	m*	is	largely	distinct	
from	m	and	Woody	actually	originated	from	m*,	then	it	is	necessary	
that	Woody	did	not	originate	from	m]	would	then	mean	that	it	is	nec-
essary	that	necessarily,	Woody	did	not	originate	from	m.
But	why	 think,	 in	 this	 case,	 that	 the	 a	 priori	 status	 of	 our	 condi-
tional	—	‘if	m*	is	largely	distinct	from	m	and	Woody	actually	originat-
ed	 from	m*,	 then	 it	 is	necessary	 that	Woody	did	not	originate	 from	
m’	—	translates	into	the	necessity	of	the	proposition	that	it	expresses?	
Principle	(e)	above	certainly	does	not	license	that	conclusion;	the	con-
ditional	just	cited	is	not	constant,	on	account	of	the	inclusion	of	‘actu-
ally’	in	its	antecedent.	And,	in	fact,	Salmon’s	example	suggests	that	we	
merely	have	here	an	interesting	example	of	the	contingent	a	priori.	For	
if	it	is	possibly	possible	for	Woody	to	originate	from	m,	then	it	is	pos-
sible	for	the	previous	conditional	to	be	false,	as	its	antecedent	is	then	
necessary	although	its	consequent	is	possibly	false.31
30.	More	generally,	the	sorts	of	examples	owed	to	Chandler	and	Salmon	exploit	
a	supposed	dependency	of	certain	necessities	upon	contingent	features	of	ac-
tuality.	So	while	those	dependencies	may	be	knowable	a	priori,	and	may	even	
hold	necessarily,	the	contingency	of	the	conditions	resulting	in	the	relevant	
necessities	would	stop	suitable	versions	of	Cameron’s	argument	from	getting	
off	the	ground.
31.	 Following	on	from	the	previous	footnote,	then,	one	cannot	create	problems	
for	the	cases	owed	to	Chandler	and	Salmon	by	using	rigidifiers	to	sidestep	
the	contingency	of	the	actual	features	upon	which	the	necessity	of	their	sup-
posedly	 possibly	 nonnecessary	 propositions	 is	 based.	 For	 if	Chandler	 and	
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